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Fact-Free Learning
By ENRIQUETA ARAGONES, ITZHAK GILBOA, ANDREW POSTLEWAITE, AND
DAVID SCHMEIDLER*
People may be surprised to notice certain regularities that hold in existing knowl-
edge they have had for some time. That is, they may learn without getting new
factual information. We argue that this can be partly explained by computational
complexity. We show that, given a knowledge base, finding a small set of variables
that obtain a certain value of R2 is computationally hard, in the sense that this term
is used in computer science. We discuss some of the implications of this result and
of fact-free learning in general. (JEL D83)
The process of induction is the process of
assuming the simplest law that can be
made to harmonize with our experience.
Ludwig Wittgenstein (1922)
Understanding one’s social environment re-
quires accumulating information and finding
regularities in that information. Many theoreti-
cal models of learning focus on learning new
facts, on their integration in an existing knowl-
edge base, and on the way they modify beliefs.
Within the Bayesian framework, the integration
of new facts and the modification of beliefs is
done mechanically according to Bayes’s rule.
Much of human learning, however, has to do
with making observations and finding regulari-
ties that, in principle, could have been deter-
mined using existing knowledge, rather than
with the acquisition of new facts.
Consider technological innovations. In many
cases, the main idea of an innovation involves
combining well-known facts. For instance, put-
ting wheels at the bottom of a suitcase allows it
to roll easily. This idea was quite original when
it was first introduced. But, since it only se-
lected and combined facts that everyone had
already known, it appears obvious in hindsight.
It takes originality to come up with such an
idea, but no particular expertise is needed to
judge its value. This phenomenon is so perva-
sive that it has been canonized in literature:
Sherlock Holmes regularly explains how the
combination of a variety of clues leads inexo-
rably to a particular conclusion, following
which Watson exclaims, “Of course!”
To consider an even more extreme case, as-
sume that an individual follows a mathematical
proof of a theorem. In order to check the proof,
one need not resort to the knowledge of facts.
The knowledge that the agent acquires in the
process has always been, in principle, available
to her. Yet, mathematics has to be studied. In
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fact, it is an entire discipline based solely on
fact-free learning.
In this paper we focus on a particular type of
fact-free learning. We consider an agent who
has access to a database, involving many vari-
ables and many observations. The agent at-
tempts to find regularities in the database. We
model this learning problem and explain the
difficulty in solving it optimally.1
The immediate consequence of this difficulty
is that individuals typically will not discover all
the regularities in their knowledge base, and
may overlook the most useful regularities. Two
people with the same knowledge base may no-
tice different regularities, and may consequently
hold different views about a particular issue.
One person may change the beliefs and actions
of another without communicating new facts,
but simply by pointing to a regularity over-
looked by the other person. On the other hand,
people may agree to disagree even if they have
the same knowledge base and are communicat-
ing. We elaborate on these consequences in
Section III.
For illustration, consider the following example.
Ann: “Russia is a dangerous country.”
Bob: “Nonsense.”
Ann: “Don’t you think that Russia might initiate
a war against a Western country?”
Bob: “Not a chance.”
Ann: “Well, I believe it very well might.”
Bob: “Can you come up with examples of
wars that erupted between two democratic
countries?”
Ann: “I guess so. Let me see ... How about
England and the United States in 1812?”
Bob: “OK, save colonial wars.”
Ann: “Well, then, let’s see. OK, maybe you
have a point. Perhaps Russia is not so
dangerous.”
Bob seems to have managed to change Ann’s
views without providing Ann with any new
factual information. Rather, he pointed out a
regularity in Ann’s knowledge base of which
she had been unaware: democratic countries
have seldom waged war on each other.2
It is likely that Ann failed to notice that the
democratic peace phenomenon holds in her own
knowledge base simply because it had not oc-
curred to her to categorize wars by the type of
regime of the countries involved. For most peo-
ple, wars are categorized, or “indexed,” by
chronology and geography, but not by regime.
Once the variable “type of regime” is intro-
duced, Ann will be able to reorganize her
knowledge base and observe the regularity she
had failed to notice earlier.
Fact-free learning is not always due to the
introduction of a new variable, or a categoriza-
tion that the individual has not been aware of.
Often, one may be aware of all variables in-
volved, and yet fail to see a regularity that
involves a combination of such variables. Con-
sider an econometrician who wants to under-
stand the determinants of the rate of economic
growth. She has access to a large database of
realized growth rates for particular economies
that includes a plethora of variables describing
these economies in detail.3 Assume that the
econometrician prefers fewer explanatory vari-
ables to more. Her main difficulty is to deter-
mine what set of variables to use in her
regression.
We can formalize her problem as determining
whether there exists a set of k regressors that
gives a particular level of R2. This is a well-
defined problem that can be relegated to com-
puter software. However, testing all subsets of k
regressors out of, say, m variables involves run-
ning (km)  O(mk) regressions. When m and k
are of realistic magnitude, it is impractical to
perform this exhaustive search. For instance,
choosing the best set of k  13 regressors out of
m  100 potentially relevant variables involves
1 Herbert Simon (1955) argued a half century ago for
incorporation of “the physiological and psychological lim-
itations” in models of decision making.
2 In the field of international relations, this is referred to
as the “democratic peace phenomenon.” (See, e.g., Zeev
Maoz and Bruce Russett, 1993.)
3 As an example of the variety of variables that may
potentially be relevant, consider the following quote from a
recent paper by Raphael La Porta et al. (1998) on the quality
of government: “We find that countries that are poor, close
to the equator, ethnolinguistically heterogeneous, use
French or socialist laws, or have high proportions of Cath-
olics or Muslims exhibit inferior government performance.”
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( 13100)  7  1015 regressions. On a computer that
can perform 10 million regression analyses per
second, this task would take more than twenty-
two years.
Linear regression is a structured and rela-
tively well-understood problem, and one may
hope that, using clever algorithms that employ
statistical analysis, the best set of k regressors
can be found without actually testing all (km)
subsets. Our main result is that this is not the
case. Formally, we prove that finding whether k
regressors can obtain a prespecified value of
R2, r, is, in the language of computer science,
NP-Complete.4 Moreover, we show that this
problem is hard (NP-Complete) for every posi-
tive value of r. Thus, our regression problem
belongs to a large family of combinatorial prob-
lems for which no efficient (polynomial) algo-
rithm is known. An implication of this result is
that, even for moderate size datasets, it will
generally be impossible to know the trade-off
between increasing the number of regressors
and increasing the explanatory power of those
regressors.5
Our interest is not in the problem econome-
tricians face, but in the problems encountered
by nonspecialists attempting to understand their
environment. That is, we wish to model the
reasoning of standard economic agents, rather
than of economists analyzing data. We contend,
however, that a problem that is difficult to solve
for a working economist will also be difficult
for an economic agent. If an econometrician
cannot be guaranteed to find the “best” set of
regressors, many economic agents may also fail
to identify important relationships in their per-
sonal knowledge base.6
Neither economic agents nor social scientists
typically look for the best set of regressors
without any guiding principle. Rather than en-
gaging in data mining, they espouse and de-
velop various theories that guide their search for
regularities. Our econometrician will often have
some idea about which variables may be con-
ducive to growth. She therefore need not ex-
haust all subsets of k regressors in her quest for
the “best” regression. Our model does not cap-
ture the development of and selection among
causal theories, but even the set of variables
potentially relevant to our econometrician’s the-
ory is typically large enough to raise computa-
tional difficulties. More importantly, if the
econometrician wants to test her scientific par-
adigm, and if she wants to guarantee that she is
not missing some important regularities that lie
outside her paradigm, she cannot restrict atten-
tion to the regressors she has already focused
on.
While computational complexity is not the
only reason why individuals may be surprised to
discover regularities in their own knowledge
bases, it is one of the reasons that knowledge of
facts does not imply knowledge of all their
implications. Hence, computational complexity,
alongside unawareness, makes fact-free learn-
ing a common phenomenon.
In Section I, we lay out our model and dis-
cuss several notions of regularities and the cri-
teria to choose among them. The difficulty of
discovering satisfactory sets of regressors is
proven in Section II. In the last section, we
discuss the results, their implications, and re-
lated literature.
I. Regularities in a Knowledge Base
An individual’s knowledge base consists of
her observations and past experiences, as well
as observations related to her by others. We will
assume that observations are represented as vec-
tors of numbers. An entry in the vector might be
the value of a certain numerical variable, or a
measure of the degree to which the observation
has a particular attribute. Thus, we model the
information available to an individual as a
knowledge base consisting of a matrix of num-
bers where rows correspond to observations
(distinct pieces of information) and columns to
attributes.
We show below a fraction of a conceivable
knowledge base pertinent to the democratic
peace example. The value in a given entry rep-
resents the degree to which the attribute
4 In Section II, we explain the concept of NP-Complete-
ness and provide references to formal definitions.
5 In particular, principle components analysis, which
finds a set of orthogonal components, is not guaranteed to
find the best combination of predictors (with unconstrained
correlations).
6 We discuss this further in Section III.
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Observation M1 M2 D1 D2 T W
World War II7 0.7 1 1 0 0 1
Cuban Missile Crisis 1 1 1 0 1 0
1991 Gulf War 1 0.3 1 0 1 1
Mi—How strong was country i?
Di—Was country i a democracy?
T—Was it after 1945?
W—Did war result?
(column) holds for the observation (row). (The
numbers are illustrative only.)
The democratic peace regularity states that if,
for any given observation, the attribute W as-
sumes the value 1, then at least one of the
attributes {D1, D2} does not assume that value.8
This model is highly simplified in several
respects. It assumes that the individual has ac-
cess to a complete matrix of data, whereas in
reality certain entries in the matrix may not be
known or remembered. The model implicitly
assumes also that all variables are observed with
accuracy. More importantly, in our model, we
assume that observations are already encoded
in a particular way that facilitates identifying
regularities.9
We will prove that, despite all these simpli-
fying assumptions, it is hard to find regularities
in the knowledge base. Finding regularities in
real knowledge bases, which are not so tidy,
would be even more difficult.
The democratic peace phenomenon is an ex-
ample of an association rule. Such a rule states
that if, for any given observation, the values of
certain attributes are within stipulated ranges,
then the values of other attributes are within
prespecified ranges. An association rule does
not apply to the entire knowledge base: its scope
is the set of observations that satisfies its ante-
cedent. It follows that association rules differ
from each other in their generality, or scope of
applicability. Adding variables to the anteced-
ent (weakly) decreases the scope of such a rule,
but may increase its accuracy. For example, we
may refine the democratic peace rule by exclud-
ing observations prior to the First World War.
This will eliminate some exceptions to the rule
(e.g., the War of 1812 and the Boer War) but
will result in a less general rule.
A second type of regularity is a functional
rule, a rule that points to a functional relation-
ship between several “explanatory” variables
(attributes) and another one (the “predicted”
variable). A well-known example of such a rule
is linear regression, with which we deal in the
formal analysis. All functional rules on a given
knowledge base have the same scope of appli-
cability, or the same generality.
Both association rules and functional rules
may be ranked according to accuracy and sim-
plicity. Each criterion admits a variety of mea-
sures, depending on the specific model. In the
case of linear regression, it is customary to
measure accuracy by R2, while simplicity is
often associated with a low number of variables.
Irrespective of the particular measures used,
people generally prefer high accuracy and low
complexity. The preference for accuracy is per-
haps the most obvious: rules are supposed to
describe the knowledge base, and accuracy is sim-
ply the degree to which they succeed in doing so.
The preference for simplicity is subtler. A
standard econometric exercise is to use a data-
base consisting of a number of observations to
derive a linear relationship between a variable
of interest and other variables. The goal is to use
the linear relationship to predict the variable of
interest in similar situations in the future. A
typical example would consist of a number of
7 We refer here to England’s declaration of war on Ger-
many on September 3, 1939.
8 More precisely, this is the contrapositive of the demo-
cratic peace regularity.
9 For instance, in this matrix, country “1” is always the
democratic one. But, when representing a real-life case by a
row in the matrix, one may not know which country should
be dubbed “1” and which “2.” This choice of encoding is
immaterial in the democratic peace phenomenon, because
this rule is symmetric with respect to the countries. If,
however, we were to consider the rule “a democratic coun-
try would never attack another country,” encoding would
matter. If the encoding system keeps country “1” as a
designator of a democratic country (as long as one of the
countries involved is indeed a democracy), this rule would
take the form “if D1  1 then A1  0,” where Ai stands for
“country i attacked.” If, however, the encoding system does
not retain this regularity, the same rule will not be as simple
to formulate. In fact, it would require a formal relation
between variables, allowing to state: “For every i, if Di  1
then Ai  0.” Since such relations are not part of our formal
model, the model would give rise to different regularities
depending on the encoding system. Indeed, finding the
“appropriate” encoding is part of the problem of finding
regularities in the database.
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past instances in which women with breast can-
cer were given different treatments. Each obser-
vation would consist of the treatment, a number
of diagnostic tests such as blood chemistry,
location of the tumor, size of the tumor in
X-rays, etc., and the degree to which the treat-
ment was successful. These observations would
be used to determine a linear relationship be-
tween the diagnostic tests and the degree of
success for each treatment. The resulting rela-
tionship is then used to predict the success of
future cases.
When faced with a problem such as this, a
scientist need not automatically prefer fewer
explanatory variables to more. The literature in
statistics and machine learning provides criteria
for “model selection,” and, in particular, for the
inclusion of explanatory variables, in such a
way as to avoid spurious correlations and “over-
fitting.” Our interest, however, is not in the way
a scientist or an econometrician would use a
database to predict future outcomes, but rather
in the way an ordinary person might find rela-
tionships in his or her personal knowledge base.
We maintain that, other things being equal, peo-
ple tend to have more faith in the robustness of
relationships that use fewer variables than in
those that use more. That is, we suggest that the
preference for parsimony and simplicity, as
measured by the number of variables employed,
is a natural tendency of the human mind.
Individuals may prefer fewer explanatory
variables because of availability of data. Having
a rule that involves more variables implies that
more variables need to be gathered and main-
tained in order to use it. Importantly, it also
makes it less likely that all the variables needed
for the application of the rule will indeed be
available in a related problem.
When fewer variables are involved, people
will find it easier to make up explanations for a
regularity in the data. This may be another
reason for the preference for fewer variables. Be
that as it may, the (normative) claim that people
should prefer simpler theories to more complex
ones goes back to William of Occam, and the
(descriptive) claim that this is how the human
mind works can also be found in Wittgenstein
(1922).
In this paper, we assume that people gener-
ally prefer rules that are as accurate and as
simple as possible. Of course, these properties
present one with nontrivial trade-offs. In the
next section, we discuss functional rules for a
given knowledge base. We will show that the
feasible set in the accuracy-simplicity space
cannot be easily computed. A similar result can
be shown for association rules. We choose to
focus on linear regression for two reasons. First,
in economics it is a more common technique for
uncovering rules. Second, our main result is less
straightforward in the case of linear regression.
II. The Complexity of Linear Regression
In this section, we study the trade-off be-
tween simplicity and accuracy of functional
rules in the case of linear regression. While
regression analysis is a basic tool of scientific
research, here we view it as an idealized model
of nonprofessional human reasoning.10 For a
given variable, one attempts to find those vari-
ables that predict the variable of interest. A
common measure of amount of variation in the
variable of interest that is explained by the
predicting variables is the coefficient of deter-
mination, R2. A reasonable measure of com-
plexity is the number of explanatory variables
one uses. The “adjusted R2” is frequently used
as a measure of the quality of a regression,
trading off accuracy and simplicity. Adjusted R2
essentially levies a multiplicative penalty for
additional variables to offset the spurious in-
crease in R2 which results from an increase in
the number of predicting variables. In recent
years statisticians and econometricians for the
most part have used additive penalty functions
in model specification (choosing the predicting
variables) for a regression problem.11 The dif-
ferent penalties are associated with different
criteria determining the trade-off between par-
simony and precision. Each penalty function
can be viewed as defining preferences over the
number of included variables and R2, reflecting
the trade-off between simplicity and accuracy.
Rather than choose a specific penalty function,
10 See Margaret Bray and Nathan Savin (1986), who
used regression analysis to model the learning of economic
agents.
11 See, e.g., Trevor Hastie et al. (2001) for a discussion
of model specification and penalty functions.
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we assume more generally that an individual
can be ascribed a function u :   [0, 1]3 ,
which represents her preferences for simplicity
and accuracy, where u(k, r) is her utility for a
regression that attains R2  r with k explanatory
variables. Thus, if u( , ) is decreasing in its first
argument and increasing in the second, a person
who chooses a rule so as to maximize u may be
viewed as though she prefers both simplicity
and accuracy, and trades them off as described
by u.
Our aim is to demonstrate that finding “good”
rules is a difficult computational task. We use
the concept of NP-Completeness from com-
puter science to formalize the notion of diffi-
culty of solving problems. A yes/no problem is
NP if it is easy (can be performed in polynomial
worst-case time complexity) to verify that a
suggested solution is indeed a solution to it. If
an NP problem is also NP-Complete, then there
is at present no known algorithm, whose (worst-
case time) complexity is polynomial, that can
solve it. NP-Completeness, however, means
more than that there is no such known algo-
rithm. The nonexistence of such an algorithm is
not due to the fact that the problem is new or
unstudied. For NP-Complete problems, it is
known that if a polynomial algorithm were
found for one of them, such an algorithm could
be translated into polynomial algorithms for all
other problems in NP. Thus, a problem that is
NP-Complete is at least as hard as many prob-
lems that have been extensively studied for
years and for which no polynomial algorithm
has yet been found.
We emphasize again that the rules we discuss
do not necessarily offer complete theories, iden-
tify causal relationships, provide predictions, or
suggest courses of action. Rules are regularities
that hold in a given knowledge base, and they
may be purely coincidental. Rules may be as-
sociated with theories, but we do not purport to
model the process of developing and choosing
among theories.
Assume that we are trying to predict a vari-
able Y given the explanatory variables X 
(X1, ... , Xm). For a subset K of {X1, ... , Xm}, let
RK2 be the value of the coefficient of determina-
tion R2 when we regress (yi)in on (xij)in, jK.
We assume that the data are given in their
entirety, that is, that there are no missing values.
How does one select a set of explanatory
variables? First, consider the feasible set of
rules projected onto the accuracy-complexity
space. For a set of explanatory variables K, let
the degree of complexity be k  K and a
degree of accuracy  r  RK2 . Consider the k-r
space and, for a given knowledge base X 
(X1, ... , Xm) and a variable Y, denote by F(X, Y)
the set of pairs (k, r) for which there exists a rule
with these parameters. Because the set F(X) is
defined only for integer values of k, and for
certain values of r, it is more convenient to
visualize its comprehensive closure defined by:
FX, Y 	k, r 
 
0, 1 ? k, r FX, Y, k k, r r.
The set F(X, Y) is schematically illustrated in
Figure 1. Note that it need not be convex.
The optimization problem that such a person
with utility function u( , ) faces is depicted in
Figure 2.
This optimization problem is hard to solve,
because one generally cannot know its feasible
set. In fact, for every r  0, given X, Y, k,
determining whether (k, r)  F(X, Y) is com-
putationally hard:
THEOREM 1: For every r  (0, 1], the fol-
lowing problem is NP-Complete: Given explan-
atory variables X  (X1, ... , Xm), a variable Y,
and an integer k  1, is there a subset K of
{X1, ... , Xm} such that K  k and RK2  r?
Theorem 1 explains why people may be sur-
prised to learn of simple regularities that exist in
a knowledge base they have access to. A person
who has access to the data should, in principle,
be able to assess the veracity of all linear theo-
ries pertaining to these data. Yet, due to com-
putational complexity, this capability remains
theoretical. In practice, one may often find that
one has overlooked a simple linear regularity
that, once pointed out, seems evident.
We show that, for any positive value of r, it
is hard to determine whether a given k is in the
r-cut of F(X, Y) when the input is (X, Y, k). By
contrast, for a given k, computing the k-cut of
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F(X, Y) is a polynomial problem (when the
input is (X, Y, r)), bounded by a polynomial of
degree k. Recall, however, that k is bounded
only by the number of columns in X. Moreover,
even if k is small, a polynomial of degree k may
assume large values if m is large. We conclude
that, in general, finding the frontier of the set
F(X, Y), as a function of X and Y, is a hard
problem. The optimization problem depicted in
Figure 2 has a fuzzy feasible set, as described in
Figure 3.
A decision maker may choose a functional
rule that maximizes u(k, r) out of all the rules
she is aware of, but the latter are likely to
constitute only a subset of the set of rules de-
fining the actual set F(X, Y). Hence, many of
the rules that people formulate are not necessar-
ily the simplest (for a given degree of accuracy)
or the most accurate (for a given degree of
complexity).
We conclude this section with the observa-
tion that one may prove theorems similar to
Theorem 1, which would make explicit refer-
ence to a certain function u(k, r). The following
is an example of such a theorem.
THEOREM 2: For every r  (0, 1], the fol-
lowing problem is NP-Complete: given explan-
atory variables X  (X1, ... , Xm) and a
variable Y, is there a subset K of {X1, ... , Xm}
that obtains an adjusted R2 of at least r?
As is clear from the proof of Theorem 2, this
result does not depend on the specific measure
FIGURE 1
FIGURE 2
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of the accuracy-simplicity trade-off, and similar
results can be proven for a variety of functions
u(k, r).12
III. Discussion
A. Approximation
We posed a particular question—does there
exist a set of k explanatory variables for which
the adjusted R2 is at least r?—and showed that
it is NP-Complete. We argue that an implication
of the result is that people will generally not
know the regularities that exist in their knowl-
edge base. But it is possible that, while it may
be extremely difficult to get an exact answer to
the question “What is the maximum R2 possible
with k variables?,” it may be dramatically easier
to obtain a very good approximation to such a
question. If there are fast heuristics that do
reasonably well on the regression problem, the
scope of fact-free learning may be quite limited.
However, it is generally not the case that
NP-Complete problems admit polynomial ap-
proximations. Consider, for instance, the NP-
Complete problem Minimum Exact Cover,
which can be described as follows. Given a set
S and a set of subsets of S, , is there a
collection of pairwise disjoint subsets of S in 
whose union equals S? This is the yes/no prob-
lem we have used in the proof of Theorem 1.13
To define the notion of approximation, one de-
fines an optimization problem that corresponds
to the yes/no problem. For instance, the Mini-
mum Exact Cover problem can be viewed as
corresponding to the following optimization
problem: minimize the sum of the cardinalities
of the sets in a collection that covers S. If the
solution is the cardinality of S, an exact cover
has been identified.
How good an approximation can one get to
the problem—minimize the sum of the cardi-
nalities of the sets that cover S—with an algo-
rithm that is polynomial in the size of the
problem? Suppose, for example, that one
wanted an algorithm that had the property that,
for all problems in this class, if the minimum
possible sum for the problem were n, the algo-
rithm would find a set of subsets with total
cardinality n for some   1. ( might be
thought of as the accuracy of the approxima-
tion.) It is known that there does not exist such
a polynomial algorithm, no matter how large 
is, unless P  NP (Carston Lund and Mihalis
Yannakakis, 1994; Ran Raz and Shmuel Safra,
1997). In other words, finding an algorithm that
assures any degree of reliability for large prob-
12 There are, however, functions v for which the result
does not hold. For example, consider v(k, r)  min(r, 2 
k). This function obtains its maximum at k  1 and it is
therefore easy to maximize it.
13 That is, our proof consists of showing that any in-
stance of the Minimum Exact Cover problem can be trans-
lated, via a polynomial algorithm, to an instance of the
problem defined in Theorem 1, such that the answer to the
latter is “yes” iff “so” is the answer to the former.
FIGURE 3
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lems is as hard as solving NP-Complete prob-
lems themselves.
We should emphasize that the difficulty in
approximating the minimum exact cover prob-
lem doesn’t assure that it is equally difficult to
approximate our regression problem. An algo-
rithm that provides a good approximation to one
problem will not necessarily translate into a
good approximation to other problems. While it
is beyond the scope of this paper to determine
how well one might approximate the regression
problem analyzed above, we note that many (if
not most) of the NP-Complete problems whose
approximation have been studied turned out to
be difficult to approximate.14
B. The Relevance of NP-Completeness
We maintain that a problem that is NP-
Complete will be hard for economic agents to
solve. Agents may obtain or learn the optimal
solutions to particular instances of the general
problem, especially if they are interested only in
instances described by small inputs. But should
economic agents encounter new instances of
reasonable sizes on a regular basis, high com-
putational complexity implies that it is unlikely
that all, or most, agents in the economy would
determine the optimal solutions in these instances.
In the case of fact-free learning, economic
agents are called upon to find regularities in large
knowledge bases. These regularities cannot be
uncovered once and for all. The economic and
political environment changes constantly and
the lore of yesterday does not provide a blue-
print for the decisions of tomorrow. It is there-
fore reasonable to model economic agents as
problem solvers who constantly need to cope
with new and large problems.
One can argue that NP-Completeness is a
concept that relates to the way computers per-
form computations, and has little or no bearing
on human reasoning. Indeed, there are problems
such as natural language understanding or face
recognition that toddlers perform better than do
computers. But these are problems for which
finding an appropriate mathematical model is a
major part of the solution. By contrast, for well-
defined combinatorial problems such as those in
the class NP, it is rarely the case that humans
perform better than do computers. Our modest
claim is that it is safe to assume that neither
people nor computers can solve NP-Complete
problems optimally.
One may question the use of complexity con-
cepts that are defined by worst-case analysis.
Indeed, why would we worry about an algorithm
whose worst-case performance is exponential, if
it is polynomial on average? Experience, how-
ever, indicates that NP-Complete problems do
not tend to be efficiently solvable even in ex-
pectation, under any reasonable assumptions on
the distribution of inputs.15
We do not claim that the inability to solve
NP-Complete problems is necessarily the most
important cognitive limitation on people’s abil-
ity to perform induction. As mentioned above,
even polynomial problems can be difficult to
solve when the knowledge base consists of
many cases and many attributes. Moreover, it is
often the case that looking for a general rule
does not even cross someone’s mind. Yet, the
difficulty of performing induction shares with
NP-Complete problems this central property:
while it is hard to come up with a solution to
such a problem, it is easy to verify whether a
suggested solution is valid.
People need not be lazy or irrational to ex-
plain why they do not find all relevant rules.
Rather, looking for simple regularities is a gen-
uinely hard problem. There is nothing irrational
about not being able to solve NP-Complete prob-
lems. Faced with the problem of selecting a set of
explanatory variables, which is NP-Complete,
people may use various heuristics to find pre-
diction rules, but they cannot be sure, in gen-
eral, that the rules they find are the simplest or
most accurate ones.
14 See, for example, the descriptions of attainable ap-
proximations to NP-Complete problems on the Web site, “A
Compendium of NP Optimization Problems” (http://www.
nada.kth.se/˜viggo/problemlist/compendium.html).
15 See Christos Papadimitriou (1994), who makes this
point and emphasizes that the example of linear program-
ming confirms this experience. Indeed, the Simplex algo-
rithm has exponential worst-case time complexity but very
good expected complexity. Linear programming, however,
is not an NP-Complete problem, and there are now algo-
rithms to solve linear programming problems with polyno-
mial worst-case performance.
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C. Implications
Agreeing to Disagree.—Our model suggests
two reasons why people may have different
beliefs, even if these beliefs are defined by rules
that are derived from a shared knowledge base.
First, two people may notice different regulari-
ties. Since finding the “best” regularities is a
hard problem, we should not be surprised if one
person failed to see a regularity that another
came up with. Second, even if the individuals
share the rules that they found, they may enter-
tain different beliefs if they make different
trade-offs between the accuracy and the sim-
plicity of rules. Different people may well have
different u functions, with some people more
willing to sacrifice accuracy for simpler rules. If
two individuals choose different levels of sim-
plicity, they may also disagree on the relevance
of a characteristic. In particular, a variable that
is important when there are relatively few other
variables in a regression may not be important if
the number of variables considered increases.
Thus, a particular attribute may play a large role
in the rule one person uses, but no role in the
rule another employs.
Locally Optimal Rules.—Our central point is
that people use rules that are not fully optimal
because of the complexity of the problem of
finding fully optimal rules. When an individual
uses a rule that is less than fully optimal, she
may improve upon the rule by considering al-
ternatives to it. A person faced with the regres-
sion problem may think of alternatives to her
current “best” regression by adding or deleting
variables from her current included set, or by
replacing variables in the included set with oth-
ers. While we do not formally model this search
and revision process, one can imagine two dis-
tinct ways people may update the rules they use.
One can search “locally,” that is, consider rel-
atively minor changes in the current rule such as
adding, deleting, or replacing one or two vari-
ables; or one can search “globally,” by consid-
ering sets of variables that have no relation
whatsoever to the current set of variables. Local
search may find local optima that are not global
optima. Differently put, people may get “stuck”
with suboptimal rules that can be improved
upon only with a “paradigm shift” which con-
siders a completely different way of looking at
a problem.
Path Dependence.—When individuals search
locally for improved rules, their reasoning is
likely to exhibit path dependence. Two individ-
uals who begin with different initial sets of
variables can settle on very different rules, even
after very long search times.
Regret.—Our model suggests different no-
tions of regret. In a standard model, individuals
make optimal choices, given the information
available to them at the time they decide. In a
stochastic environment, an individual may wish
ex post that she had decided differently. A ra-
tional person, however, has no reason to regret
a decision she had taken since she could have
done no better at the time of her decision, given
the information available to her at that time. In
our model, there are two notions in which in-
formation can be “given,” and, correspondingly,
two possible sources of regret. As usual, one
may learn the realization of a random variable
and wish that she had decided differently. But
one can also learn of a rule that one has not been
aware of, even though the rule could be derived,
in principle, from one’s knowledge base.
Should one feel regret as a result? As argued
above, one could not be expected to solve NP-
Complete problems, and therefore it may be
argued that one could not have chosen opti-
mally. Yet, one might expect individuals to
experience a stronger sense of “I should have
known” as a result of finding rules that hold in
a given knowledge base, than as a result of
getting new observations.
D. Related Literature
Most of the formal literature in economic
theory and in related fields is based on the
Bayesian model of information processing. In
this model, a decision maker starts out with a
prior probability, and she updates it in the face
of new information by Bayes’s rule. Hence, this
model captures nicely changes in opinion that
result from new information. But it does not
deal very graciously with changes of opinion
that are not driven by new information. In fact,
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in a Bayesian model with perfect rationality,
people cannot change their opinions unless new
information has been received. It follows that
the example we started out with cannot be ex-
plained by such models.
Relaxing the perfect rationality assumption,
one may attempt to provide a pseudo-Bayesian
account of the phenomena discussed here. For
instance, one can use a space of states of the
world to describe the subjective uncertainty that
a decision maker has regarding the result of a
computation, before this computation is carried
out (see Luca Anderlini and Leonardo Felli,
1994; Nabil Al-Najjar et al., 1999). In such a
model, one would be described as if one en-
tertained a prior probability of, say, p, that
“democratic peace” holds. Upon hearing the
rhetorical question as in our dialogue, the
decision maker performs the computation of
the accuracy of this rule, and is described as
if the result of this computation were new
information.
A related approach employs a subjective state
space to provide a Bayesian account of unfore-
seen contingencies (see David Kreps, 1979,
1992; Eddie Dekel et al., 1997, 1998). Should
this approach be applied to the problem of in-
duction, each regularity that might hold in the
knowledge base would be viewed as an unfore-
seen contingency that might arise. A decision
maker’s behavior will then be viewed as arising
from Bayesian optimization with respect to a
subjective state space that reflects her subjective
uncertainty.
Our approach is compatible with these pseudo-
Bayesian models. Its relative strength is that it
models the process of induction more explicitly,
allowing a better understanding of why and
when induction is likely to be a hard problem.
Gilboa and Schmeidler (2001) offer a theory
of case-based decision making. They argue that
cases are the primitive objects of knowledge,
and that rules and probabilities are derived from
cases. Moreover, rules and probabilities cannot
be known in the same sense, and to the same
degree of certitude, that cases can. Yet, rules
and probabilities may be efficient and insightful
ways of succinctly summarizing many cases.
The present paper suggests that summarizing
knowledge bases by rules may involve loss of
information, because one cannot be guaranteed
to find the “optimal” rules that a given knowl-
edge base induces.
APPENDIX: PROOFS
PROOF OF THEOREM 1:
Let there be given r  0. It is easy to see that
the problem is in NP: given a suggested set K
{1, ... , m}, one may calculate RK2 in polynomial
time in Kn (which is bounded by the size of the
input, (m  1)n).16 To show that the problem is
NP-Complete, we use a reduction of the follow-
ing problem, which is known to be NP-Complete
(see Michael Gary and David Johnson, 1979; or
Papadimitriou, 1994):
Problem Exact Cover: Given a set S, a set of
subsets of S, , are there pairwise disjoint sub-
sets in  whose union equals S?
(That is, does a subset of  constitute a
partition of S?)
Given a set S, a set of subsets of S,, we will
generate n observations of (m  1) variables,
(xij)in, jm and (yi)in , and a natural number
k, such that S has an exact cover in  iff there
is a subset K of {1, ... , m} with K  k and
RK2  r.
Let there be given, then, S and . Assume
without loss of generality that S  {1, ... , s},
and that   {S1, ... , Sl} (where s, l  1 are
natural numbers). We construct n  2(s  l 
1) observations of m  2l predicting variables.
It will be convenient to denote the 2l predicting
variables by X1, ... , Xl and Z1, ... , Zl and the
predicted variable—by Y. Their corresponding
values will be denoted (xij)in, j l, (zij)in, j l,
and (yi)in. We will use Xj, Zj, and Y also to
denote the column vectors (xij)in , (zij)in , and
(yi)in , respectively. Let M 0 be a constant to
be specified later. We now specify the vectors
X1, ... , Xl, Z1, ... , Zl, and Y as a function of M.
16 Here and in the sequel, we assume that reading an
entry in the matrix X or in the vector Y, as well as any
algebraic computation, requires a single time unit. Our
results hold also if one assumes that xij and yi are all rational
and take into account the time it takes to read and manip-
ulate these numbers.
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For i s and j l, xij  1 if i Sj, and xij 
0 if i  Sj;
For i  s and j  l, zij  0;
For s  i  s  l and j  l, xij  zij  1 if
i  s  j and xij  zij  0 if i  s  j;
For j  l, xs l1, j  zs l1, j  0;
For i  s  l, yi  1 and ys l1  M;
For i  s  l  1, yi  yi(s l1) and for
all j  l, xij  xi(s l1), j and zij 
zi(s l1), j.
Observe that the bottom half of the matrix X,
as well as the bottom half of the vector Y, are
the negatives of the respective top halves. This
implies that each of the variables X1, ... , Xl,
Z1, ... , Zl, and Y has a mean of zero. This, in
turn, implies that for any set of variables K,
when we regress Y on K, we get a regression
equation with a zero intercept.
Consider the matrix X and the vector Y ob-
tained above by the construction for different
values of M. Observe that the collection of sets
K that maximize RK2 is independent of M.
Hence, it is useful to define Rˆ K2 as the R2 ob-
tained from regressing Y on K, ignoring obser-
vations s  l  1 and 2(s  l  1). Obviously,
minimizing Rˆ K2 is tantamount to minimizing RK2 .
We claim that there is a subset K of {X1,
... , Xl}  {Z1, ... , Zl} with K  k  l for
which Rˆ K2  1 iff S has an exact cover from .
First assume that such a cover exists. That is,
assume that there is a set J {1, ... , l} such that
{Sj}jJ constitutes a partition of S. This means
that ¥jJ 1Sj  1S where 1A is the indicator
function of a set A. Let  be the intercept, (j)jl
be the coefficients of (Xj)j l and (j)j l—of
(Zj)j l in the regression. Set   0. For j  J,
set j  1 and j  0, and for j  J set j  0
and j  1. We claim that 1  ¥j l jXj 
¥j l jZj  Y where 1 is a vector of 1’s. For
i  s the equality
  
j l
j xij  
j l
j zij 	 
j l
j xij 	 yi 	 1
follows from ¥jJ 1Sj  1S. For s  i  s  l,
the equality
  
j l
j xij  
j l
j zij 	 j  j 	 yi 	 1
follows from our construction (assigning pre-
cisely one of {j, j} to 1 and the other—to 0).
Obviously,   ¥j l jxnj  ¥j l jznj  0 
yi  0. The number of variables used in this
regression is l. Specifically, choose K  {Xjj
J}  {Zjj  J}, with K  l, and observe that
Rˆ K2  1.
We now turn to the converse direction. As-
sume, then, that there is a subset K of {X1, ... ,
Xl} {Z1, ... , Zl} with K l for which Rˆ K2 
1. Since all variables have zero means, this
regression has an intercept of zero ( 0 in the
notation above). Let J  {1, ... , l} be the set of
indices of the X variables in K, i.e., {Xj}jJ 
K  {X1, ... , Xl}. We will show that {Sj}jJ
constitutes a partition of S. Let L {1, ... , l} be
the set of indices of the Z variables in K, i.e.,
{Zj}jL  K  {Z1, ... , Zl}. Consider the
coefficients of the variables in K used in the
regression obtaining Rˆ K2  1. Denote them by
(j)jJ and (j)jL. Define j  0 if j  J and
j  0 if j  L. Thus, we have

j l
j Xj  
j l
jZj 	 Y.
We argue that j  1 for every j  J, and
j  1 for every j  L. To see this, observe first
that for every j  l, the s  j observation
implies that j  j  1. This means that for
every j  l, j  0 or j  0 (this also implies
that either j  J or j  L). If for some j both
j  0 and j  0, we will have K  l, a
contradiction. Hence for every j l, either j 
0 or j  0, but not both. (In other words, J 
Lc.) This also implies that the non-zero coeffi-
cient out of {j, j} has to be 1.
Thus, the cardinality of K is precisely l, and
the coefficients {j, j} define a subset of
{S1, ... , Sl}: if j  1 and j  0, i.e., j  J, Sj
is included in the subset, and if j  0 and j 
1, i.e., j  J, Sj is not included in the subset.
That this subset {Sj}jJ constitutes a partition of
S follows from the first s observations as above.
We now turn to define M. We wish to do so
in such a way that, for every set of explanatory
variables K, RK2  r iff Rˆ K2  1. Fix a set K.
Denote by SSRˆ and SSTˆ the explained variance
and the total variance, respectively, of the re-
gression of Y on K without observations s 
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l  1 and 2(s  l  1), where SSR and SST
denote the variances of the regression with all
observations. Thus, RK2  SSR/SST and Rˆ K2 
SSRˆ/SSTˆ. Observe that SSTˆ 	 2s  l  and
SST  2(s  l )  2M2. Also, SSR  SSRˆ is
independent of M.
Note that if K is such that Rˆ K2  1, then
(SSR )SSRˆ  SSTˆ 2(s  l). In this case,
RK2  [2(s  l )]/[2(s  l )  2M2]. If, however,
K is such that Rˆ K2  1, then we argue that (SSR)
SSRˆ  SSTˆ  1⁄9 . Assume not. That is, assume
that K is such that SSRˆ  SSTˆ  1⁄9 . This
implies that on each of the observations 1, ... ,
s  l, s  l  2, ... , 2(s  l )  1, the fit
produced by K is at most 1⁄3 away from yi. Then
for every j  l, j  j  1  1⁄3 . Hence for
every j l either j  0 or j  0, but not both,
and the non-zero coefficient out of {j, j} has
to be in (2⁄3 , 4⁄3). But then, considering the first
s observations, we find that K is an exact cover.
It follows that, if Rˆ K2  1, then RK2  [2(s  l ) 
1⁄9]/[2(s  l )  2M2].
Choose a rational M in the interval

1
 rs l 
 1⁄18/r, 
1
 rs l /r) so
that [2(s  l )  1⁄9]/[2(s  l )  2M2]  r 
[2(s  l )]/[2(s  l )  2M2], and observe that
for this M, there exists a K such that RK2  r iff
there exists a K for which Rˆ K2  1, that is, iff K
is an exact cover.
To conclude the proof, it remains to observe
that the construction of the variables (Xj)j l,
(Zj)j l, and Y can be done in polynomial time
in the size of the input.
PROOF OF THEOREM 2:
Let there be given r  0. The proof follows
that of Theorem 1, with the following modifi-
cation. For an integer t 1, to be specified later,
we add t observations for which all the variables
((Xj)j l, (Zj)j l, and Y) assume the value 0.
These observations do not change the R2 ob-
tained by any set of regressors, as both SST and
SSR remain the same. Assuming that t has been
fixed (and that it is polynomial in the data), let
r be the R2 corresponding to an adjusted R2 of
r, with l regressors. That is, (1  r)  (1 
r)(t  2s  2l  1)/(t  2s  l  1). Define M
as in the proof of Theorem 1 for r.
We claim that there exists a set of regressors
that obtains an adjusted R2 of r iff there exists a
set of l regressors that obtains an R2 of r
(hence, iff there exists an exact cover in the
original problem). The “if” part is obvious from
our construction. Consider the “only if” part.
Assume, then, that a set of regressors obtains an
adjusted R2 of r. If it has l regressors, the same
calculation shows that it obtains the desired R2.
We now argue that if no set of l regressors
obtains an adjusted R2 of r, then no set of
regressors (of any cardinality) obtains an ad-
justed R2 of r.
Consider first a set K0 with K0  k0  l
regressors. Observe that, by the choice of M, r
is the upper bound on all RK2 for all K with K
 l, as r was computed assuming that an exact
cover exists, and that, therefore, there are l
variables that perfectly match all the observa-
tions but s  l  1 and 2(s  l  1). Due to the
structure of the problem, r is also an upper
bound on RK2 for all K with K  l. This is so
because the only observations that are not per-
fectly matched (in the hypothesized l-regressor
set) correspond to zero values of the regressors.
It follows that the adjusted R2 for K0 is lower
than r.
Next, consider a set K0 with K0  k0  l
regressors. For such a set there exists a j  l
such that neither Xj nor Zj are in K0. Hence,
observations s  j and 2s  l  j  1 cannot be
matched by the regression on K0. The lowest
possible SSE in this problem, corresponding to
the hypothesized set of l regressors, is 2M2. This
means that the SSE of K0 is at least 2M2  2.
That is, the SSE of the set K0 is at least (M2 
1)/M2 larger than the SSE used for the calcula-
tion of r. On the other hand, K0 uses fewer
variables. But if (t  2s  l  1)/(t  2s  k 
1)  (M2  1)/M2, the reduction in the number
of variables cannot pay off, and K0 has an
adjusted R2 lower than r. It remains to choose t
large enough so that the above inequality holds,
and to observe that this t is bounded by a
polynomial of the input size.
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